Deja vu: And if the cocoa price dropped?

A thumb sketch of Ivorian economic history from independence goes like this: a major cocoa farmer becomes president, encourages the development of the sector by opening up new land and encouraging farmers to cut down the forests to become productive. The cocoa sector becomes the biggest in the world by the end of the 1970s, the state creams off a good portion, and invests in great infrastructure. The country is peaceful and prosperous (hailed as the Ivorian economic miracle).

But from 1980 things change drastically as the price of cocoa drops, the country goes into a down-ward spiral, structural adjustment, political protest, and finally war. The country seemed to have great leadership in the first decade, but then the same people were in charge in the 80s, so was it more about commodity prices than vision?

An interesting new report from the World Bank asks if Cote d’Ivoire is experiencing its second economic miracle. What do we see? High cocoa prices (see 10 year price data here), high production, a healthy agricultural sector (especially cocoa, cotton and cashew), and infrastructure investments. And so, it would seem pertinent to ask if the country is again too vulnerable to cocoa price changes. One may recall that when Gbagbo took power, farmers were getting paid as little as 150 cfa at the farmgate – due in part to a botched liberalisation for which Gbagbo must bear some blame (though it started before he came to power). Gbagboists could well argue that if the cocoa price for Gbagbo had been what it is for Ouattara, maybe he would have got off to a better start. Discuss.

I don’t have comparative figures to hand, but there’s no doubting the importance of cocoa. It’s estimated at 22% of the national economy and 50% of export revenue, employing 800,000 farmers, and bringing in more than two billion euros annually. The country has been in the news for the last few days for a new target of attempting to transform 50% of cocoa beans to a semi-finished level of production by 2020. There were also headlines about producing chocolate locally.

[I’ve ranted against journalism on these things before on this blog. The 50% transformation target dates from the 1990s, and most recently it was fixed at 2015. I don’t mind dates being shifted – we all need to re-evaluate – but what I find worrying is that there seems to be a general amnesia about the original target date’s existence. When the date is changed, instead of being reported on as the moving of goalposts, it’s reported on as if the government has set itself a new objective, and that that is positive and inspirational. Chocolate has been in production in Abidjan for a long time (the Chocodi project in Gbagbo’s time). But from the news reports you’d think that no-one has ever thought of producing chocolate in Cote d’Ivoire before, and that Ivorians are suddenly going to be buying chocolate by the bucket full in a couple of years’ time.]

So, are we naive about the sustainability of the Ivorian recovery? A recent article by a Moroccan economist has added fuel to the fire. He argues that the impressive recent Ivorian economic growth is almost entirely based on high commodity prices, making it vulnerable to cyclical price changes, and climate. The head of the International Cocoa Organization, Jean-Marc Anga (an Ivorian) recently warned against the dangers of over-production.

In an editorial in the main government newspaper (which he edits), Venance Konan argued that the author makes some good points, but saying that unlike the 1960s and 1970s, the government is aware of these dangers and is working to combat them. He says the government’s investment in big infrastructure projects is proof of the willingness to diversify. If you’re not convinced by Konan, then you can find some stronger arguments in the above World Bank report (in French) which interestingly cites the increase in private sector investment as one of the key drivers of the Ivorian recovery. What does worry me though is that in almost all the economic reports from the World Bank and IMF that I see, the growth is attributed to the primary and tertiary sectors, while the industrial sector doesn’t seem part of the growth story, despite being generally acknowledged globally as being key to ‘emergence’ (it is growing, but not as much).

Development is something that takes decades and will not come overnight. Despite all the positive work being done in Cote d’Ivoire I’m amazed at how much there is still to do. How water and electricity cuts are still common, how roads like Yamoussoukro-Daloa and Abidjan-San Pedro are still in such a deplorable state, how very little has changed in four years at the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro, how the university sector still seems in trouble.

As far as I can see, sparking industrial growth is something no-one quite fully understands. On the positive side, the government has initiatives to build roads, improve the electricity supply, reform business laws and change taxes. On the negative side, human resources, corruption, small markets, limited availability of credit, and administrative challenges still seem as obstacles without much hope of rapid progress.

Will the cocoa price go down hill soon? Who can tell? At least the EU market is in bad shape, and prices are holding. But diversification away from cocoa must remain a significant part of Ivorian economic planning to avoid another disaster.

 

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Journal Gbayé – Ivory Coast’s news in rap and nouchi

I’d seen the stories about the rap news in Senegal (the JT rappé) , but now from the same outfit we have an Ivorian version, rapped/sung in French and Nouchi (local Ivorian street slang), with support from George Soros’ Open Society foundation. Things got under way a couple of weeks back and there are already three episodes out (see below). The idea is to rap about 3-4 main topics each week in a way that appeals to youth, and aside from a bit of occasional uncertainty from the presenters, it really is a fun recipe. The presenters are Nash (a well known Nouchi ambassador and rap artist), and Smile.

I’m really impressed by the creativity – after seeing the pilot I assumed the music bed wouldn’t change, but in three episodes we’ve already covered a good range of West African music styles. Not sure if they want to stay a YouTube phenomenon of if they’ll try to reach a wider audience through the main state television channel (though would that hinder their independence?).

Journal Gbayé – le pilote : “Nouveau pont”  Major topics – child kidnapping, new bridge, hygiene of homemade drinks, Congolese politics

Journal Gbayé (S01, ép. 01) : “Djassa pinhou au Plateau”  Major topics – university facilities, prostitution, elections, Senegalese politics

Journal Gbayé (S01, ép.02) : “Les Djobages”  – Major topics – covers electricity cover, university strikes and destruction of illegal constructions (with links to field reports on Arafat-style, and then reggae to celebrate the Alpha Blondy concert)

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Ivory Coast – after Houphouet’s ‘heriteurs’

As I’ve mentioned before, I don’t think most Ivory Coast observers regard the 2015 presidential election as anything much more than a foregone conclusion. The principal question seems to be how much Ouattara will win by, and whether that percentage (and turnout) signals failure or success.

But 2020 looks a whole lot more interesting. While the country’s ‘heriteurs’ (the big three ‘inheriters’ who battled it out after Felix Houphouet-Boigny’s death; namely Bedie, Gbagbo and Ouattara) will probably all still be alive, they will have all almost certainly taken their leave: all will be over the constitutional age limit. Ouattara will have completed his two constitutionally mandated terms. (Gbagbo’s trial at the ICC will be likely finished and I don’t think anyone can be certain of the result of that.)

So who are the names to watch in the new generation? I’m in the airport in Conakry belatedly going through a list in Jeune Afrique magazine of the 50 most important people in Ivory Coast, and it’s as good a place as any to pick out a few names of people who have a good chance of being either strong candidates for the election in 2020, or at least powerful people in deciding which direction things go. Here are some of my picks with comments.

Guillaume Soro (42)
A skillful politician and constitutionally the current number two in the country as head of the National Assembly. He has a power base drawn from his time at the head of the Forces Nouvelles rebellion (a significant part of the current national army) and from his days at the head of the powerful student union, the FESCI. He has been drawing closer to Ouattara’s RDR party.
Comment: A strong contender for 2020 and never one to underestimate. Will face some resistance from within the party from any attempts to be the RDR candidate in 2020. For many in the south he will always be tainted as the ‘rebel’ and many still campaign for him to answer for crimes committed by rebels during that period.

Pascal Affi N’Guessan (62)
Head of the opposition FPI party, he is facing a fierce internal war for control of the party with hard liners who want to limit all engagements with the government until Gbagbo is out of The Hague. He’s also not from the natural ethnic base of the party in the south-east. Nevertheless he still looks like the big name in the opposition camp at least until Simone or Laurent Gbagbo are freed.
Comment: May be in a stronger position by 2020 but if the government track record is solid he would likely struggle unless the governing coalition fractures. The big drama would be if either of the former ruling couple are freed and return to Abidjan. Alternatively he may be severely undermined although the party lacks many other alternatives.

Hamed Bakayoko (49)
Along with Soro, Hambak is likely to be the main contender for the RDR card in the 2020 election. That’s if he’s want it – I don’t know him well enough to know if he’d see the top job as just too much limelight. He has strong roots in the RDR particularly with the youth, and has an established network of friends in the Abidjan elite, including in the communication sector (notably Voodoo). His time as interior minister has strengthened his hand as well. More high profile than Soro at the moment.
Comment: A strong contender for 2020, especially if he ends up receiving the blessing of Ouattara.

Mamadou Koulibaly (57)
I don’t think anyone would give him much chance in 2020 but I’ll include the name anyway as a major opposition political figure. His is considered by many as the most eloquent critic of the ruling coalition since 2011. But he has a very limited support base, especially geographically, so only really has a chance if the opposition unite around him, which is something I would judge unlikely.
Comment: An interesting figure on the Ivorian political scene, but likely to remain marginal.
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Beyond the talk of Soro or Hambak, I can see two major alternatives. The first is that the PDCI succeeds in imposing their candidate as some sort of RHDP consensus (or stitch up). There is already talk of this ‘Alternance’ theory in the pro-PDCI press, though I haven’t even see an RDR figure mention it, which would seem to be crucial given it would involve the RDR agreeing to step aside in 2020 and allow a PDCI candidate to take the throne.

A second (potentially related) alternative is that Ivory Coast’s political class decides that they quite liked their nine years under a technocrat and would like more of the same. What would the major choices be:

Bruno Kone (52), RDR
This former telecommunications boss recently married Ouattara’s niece and communications director, and is minister of Information, Telecommunications and the Post Office. He’s also the government spokesman.

Thierry Tanoh (52), PDCI
Assistant Secretary General for the president, he’s currently on the recovery from a rough and brief spell as the head of Ecobank, which followed his vice-presidency of the IFC. Harvard-educated, and pushed by some (himself?) behind the scenes for several years. Limited profile within the country though.

Jean-Louis Billon (50), PDCI
Business leader, minister for commerce and one of the country’s richest people, Billon has a fair bit of local credibility and is well respected. I’m not sure how strong his voice carries in the PDCI party though, even if it has authority elsewhere.
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I confess that I’ve pretty much come to the end of my list of names for the next generation. I still think Charles Ble Goude will return one day to be an influential player, but 2020 may be too early for that. Two other people to watch in the coming years are Yasmine Ouegnin, the young MP for Cocody who has shown an independent spirit in the otherwise compliant National Assembly, and (this really is an outside chance) new Credit Suisse boss, Tidjane Thiam. Both may face criticism for being too foreign.

Many of the above candidates would look ill at ease addressing a mass rally in Yopougon or Abobo. Most Ivorians are young, employed in the informal sector and not from the elite backgrounds of the above. Through a long process and a dedicated communications team, figures like Ouattara have been able to develop a common touch, but as Gbagbo and Ble Goude showed, there can be immense power in those who can mobilise and sound in touch with ordinary voters. To that extent Soro and Hambak remain very strong candidates, while any alternatives seem to lack either the powerful networks or the ability to excite a crowd.

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Back home

Over the last week back in Abidjan, I had the pleasure of living again in the house we bought in 2010. Previously we’d been hiring a small studio for my wife to sit-out the Ebola crisis with our new baby, but the (terrible) tenants who’d been living in our own house moved out, so we took advantage to move back in, even if only for a few months. I’ll be honest and say I wasn’t sure I’d ever be sleeping in the house again.

When I first left Abidjan at the end of 2012, I went through a period of being disconnected. It wasn’t a conscious ploy, but those first 12 months in Dubai were a time when I almost stopped any activity on Twitter, the only time I’ve not blogged regularly since I started, and a period of nearly 1.5 years where I didn’t visit Abidjan. In comparison, in the last 12 months my passport testifies that I’ve gone through the arrival gates at Abidjan airport five times.

Coming back to the topic of the house again, I sometimes wonder if I’ll live there long-term again. It really is a decent place, and the roads have improved significantly around the area. There was a shortage of piped water in the sector in the last week, but hopefully this shouldn’t be a long term problem. It has plenty of rooms (three bedrooms, two lounges, a maid’s bedroom, and a three room apartment out the back, up some steps) and there’s really as much space as a normal family would ever need.

Still, I don’t know if I suffer from a lack of contentment but it has two major flaws (not uncommon in Ivorian construction) – there are almost no windows, particularly in the most important rooms, and the garden has long been almost entirely built over. All I ask is that the next place has a garden that can host a decent barbecue, and some windows that show something semi-attractive. A home on two levels might be nice too – I haven’t lived in a home with stairs since Norwich (c. 2005). Perhaps if I had those things, I’d be dreaming of a swimming pool, but we’ll see.

I’ve actually been thinking of buying a second property in Abidjan but I don’t think I can afford/justify buying the right place at the moment. The market does seem buoyant, with prices / rents rising and land being snapped up as the city pushes ever outwards. Many of the buyers (I hear from one friend in the sector) are from elsewhere in ECOWAS. Burkinabe and Nigerians (“Hausa”) were nationalities mentioned by name. I imagine Abidjan makes an attractive investment proposition for rich people in the region, perhaps some of them with cash of dubious provenance (there are less questions and pesky taxes than in Europe). The land ownership laws are liberal, the legal structure is reasonably sound, the currency is stable and secure, the economy is doing well, Abidjan is liveable, and property prices still seem low by regional standards.

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Thoughts on Dakar

After a week with the family in Abidjan, I’m now in Dakar for a workshop. It’s my first proper time in the city; my only previous visit was passing through on the way to cover the Guinea-Bissau presidential elections in 2012 and I didn’t get any further than the airport hotel.

I’ve been here for less than 24 hours, but after dinner last night and a 13km jog this morning (not that I intended it to be that long, but I got completely lost and the Senegalese seem as hopeless as Ivorians in giving directions), I feel I’ve distilled some initial impressions. I’ve definitely seen the more upper class areas of the city so my reflections are slightly skewed.

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Abidjan and Dakar are sometimes talked of as West Africa’s great rival francophone cities. The economic stats look similar – Senegal is about half the size of Ivory Coast in terms of population, as is Dakar v Abidjan, but per capita income appears similar. According to locals here, the Ivorian crisis lead to a huge expansion of expats moving to Dakar transforming an otherwise small capital city. Historically, the stereotype was that Dakar was a place of culture, and Abidjan a place for commerce.

Dakar has several advantages that I can see over Abidjan. In part, the city is helped by being a far older trading post, whereas Abidjan was a tiny fishing village a century ago.

– The quality of residential property seems of a far higher quality.

– You sense a higher level of security (as befits a place that has been so stable in its young history). There aren’t guards at every door and many of the homes are surrounded by simple low walls.

– Dakar makes the most of the sea (and has far more coastline). Abidjan does a particularly bad job of profiting from its coastal position, though the Gulf of Guinea coastline is less interesting than around here.

– There are pavements/sidewalks!

– There seem to be a good number of upmarket shops and restaurants. Abidjan has these too, but they aren’t situated in an overall context that’s attractive (cf Zone 4 or Rue des Jardins).

– There are lots of people who seem to be outside enjoying themselves. In Abidjan you get the sense that being outdoors or on the street is just for the poor.

– The weather at this time of year is refreshingly cool.

– You see a more international population here in the streets.

– Along the Corniche there were lots of joggers and others strolling and out on the beach. Ivorians are not really ones to be seen exercising outside.

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What can Abidjan do to improve? A long period of peace and security will help. The return of international institutions will be positive too. The AfDB is back, the ILO is returning, and some others will come too; private companies more so, as they tend to more flexible than international institutions, especially to high costs of living in places like Dakar.

For me, there also needs to be more effort put into urban design (developing pleasant urban settings that are enjoyable places to go to). The Cocody Bay redevelopment may help contribute to this, but it’s tricky getting the right solution – the lagoon can’t be smelly, the boulevard can’t be noisy and polluted, it needs to be easy to access and even walk to. Cocody itself needs more specific zones to go do for leisure activities. And is there a way to put more life into Plateau? Quite a lot of people still live there, but it’s still dead outside office hours.

Finally, although Abidjan doesn’t have so much history to go on, more could be done to increase the cultural offerings. Bassam has clear potential to play the same role as Goree Island, but I haven’t seen signs of the required investment and vision yet.

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Ivorian web-series: ‘Sa c koi sa enkor’

If there’s one thing that unites Ivorians, aside from football, it’s complaining about the state broadcaster RTI. Sometimes this is unfair (if you have CANAL satellite you can check out some of the other West African state tv channels, which look far worse), but there’s still a fair dose of amateurism. For me, until the news cameramen start using tripods I won’t have much respect for what’s produced.

For decades now, the various governments have promised a privatization, but despite all the noise, we don’t seem to have gotten anywhere. From the position of being in power, there’s something very attractive about having just one broadcaster you can control. The Ministry of Communication seems to feel it has enough on its plate handling the digital switch-over. But the recent award of three new private commercial radio licences are a step in the right direction, and the expansion of foreign outfits like A+, Vox Africa and TRACE in Abidjan suggest the city is becoming an audio-visual base, ahead of any liberalization.

Meanwhile, technology is offering new alternatives, from the increasingly cut-price satellite platforms, to the availability of internet speeds that can support video-streaming. On the creative side as well, video editing software to do most basic tasks comes free on computers, and increasingly affordable SLR cameras can capture stunning HD footage.

The sorts of things we’re likely to see more of include projects like ‘Sa c koi sa enkor’ (something like ‘what’s this again?’), whose team I met at the end of January while in Abidjan. They produce a regular web tv series for the Ivorian youth platform ivoirmixdj, and are building a following (18,000 and growing) on Facebook with a page, and regular short clips in between the big web-series releases. The content is comic and youth focused, but it’s attracting a growing buzz.

For me, with social media, YouTube and good use of accessible technology (especially where creatives can get to grips with getting good sound), there are huge possibilities to bypass the existing television monopoly and produce parallel audiences for Ivorians both in and outside the country. Clearly, the youth market is the one to target for now given the popularity of social media, and comedy is a good subject area as well. A parallel success is already working out for Ivorian humouristic site La Rigueur Bino.

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Below is an edited version of my discussion with the ‘Sa c koi sa enkor’ team: Ange Emmanuel Kouakou (producer), Wilfried Nanga (actor), Jennifer Kissi (actress) and Salomon Guy (sound engineer). Many thanks for the time they gave me.

- Tell me about how things started.

AK: We wanted to do just a small thing to have fun. But little by little we had some opportunities. I met a producer (Yves Roland Jay Jay) who enabled us to put the videos on ivoiremixdj to have more visibility and then I met Salomon Guy, who is now our sound engineer. With my close friends, we started posting videos and it started building momentum. We had lots of ideas and for us the goal is to get on to television, while keeping our philosophy of staying natural. We don’t want things that seem staged – on the television you have the impression that people are reading their lines. We’re speaking naturally of Ivorian realities but in a comic way.

- You seem keen to still get on traditional broadcasters?

WN: Nowadays everyone is connected so if your product gets success it’ll be seen by a lot of people. But it’s good as well to put things on a higher level (i.e. RTI) where lots of people can see these things e.g. parents. It’s true that you can see things on the web. But when people speak of your series, it shouldn’t be just for young people. It should be parents saying: ‘yes I know this series’. It’s like artists. Like DJ Arafat. When he does something, even someone in the remote village knows about it. People know that it’s serious because they have heard of it. We want to touch all generations to make this bigger and touch other audiences outside of Cote d’Ivoire. We haven’t yet been shown on the television – that’s our objective.

- Is this a business or a hobby?

WN: We’ve not yet made any money. We haven’t yet established certain things. We are building a fan-base and have lots of people who follow us. We’ve heard that on Youtube if you have a large number of visitors, you can make money. When people don’t know you, people don’t take you seriously. But if people know you then if you say ‘watch this at this time, at this platform’ people will do it. We want lots of people following us, and then we can advance. We want to have a huge fan base first.

- What’s your strategy?

AK: First off, we’re prioritising Facebook. Lots of people said ‘put your stuff on YouTube’. But we prefer to have lots of fans on Facebook and get say 50,000 fans and then go on to other platforms. We are not rushed.

WN: Each time we put videos, the likes increase a lot more. With photos, things increase slowly. But if we put a video, the videos are really shared about it so that means that lots of people see it, and lots of people who haven’t seen the page before will go to the page.

AK: If a video hasn’t had much success for us, it gets 3-5,000 views. Each time we put a video it increases the number of page likes. When we reach a certain number, people will take us seriously. Lots of people are starting to approach us.

We’re not professionals but we attempt to do what we can. But in future we hope to make things more professional. But for the moment, we just want to create some buzz.

- What’s the creative process like?

SG: We want to always have new content on the page. Generally on a Saturday we try and film several videos and then publish gradually during the week.

JK: In the week leading up to Saturday we have a few ideas on what we’re going to film. On the Saturday morning we have some final discussions.

WN: One shouldn’t forget that we all go to school. So the days that we can come together are the Saturdays. Those are the days that we try and come together. Anyone can bring ideas. But at base, the director has ideas that he proposes. We validate and discuss. If actors have ideas, they can share them and we see if the ideas are good.

The web series comes out once a fortnight on ivoiremixdj. To fill the time in between, we need to be doing something. If we want people to wait two weeks, we can do it, but it’s not certain that the public will still be there, so to keep the audience entertained we’ll publish something Monday, Wednesday, Friday and then each two weeks the web series comes out.

SG: The videos need to be short, funny or a little extravagant. The length is really important because of the bandwidth which is really limiting. The 10 minute videos don’t get as much buzz as the short ones.

AK: We’re based on what we see every day. I’m not going to criticise what we see on RTI, but personally it doesn’t please me. There were old series like ‘Faut pas facher’ – before it was good and we all liked it, but it’s not as good now. There are other series – I won’t give the names – and it feels too recited. People say to us ‘hey why doesn’t your stuff go on RTI?’. We’re just telling the story our lives.

AK: We have a project to do a short film beyond the web series. In 12 months, perhaps we’ll be on the TV, I don’t know. But the objective is to get a huge audience on the web.

SG: We shouldn’t just look at Africa. We’re already sub-titling in English to reach new audiences. Perhaps we can even do the dubbing in the studio to do several versions. But that’ll need need financing. We trying to get a large audience, then go onto YouTube, and then attract those who want visibility with financing.

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Ivory Coast’s Emergence – is the slogan realistic?

If there’s one word that’s almost impossible to escape nowadays in Ivory Coast, it’s ‘emergence’. The presidential vision is to see the country become an emerging nation by 2020. You’re almost guaranteed to hear it every single evening on RTI’s 8pm bulletin, and it’s approaching the status of a mantra, in the true sense of the word: perhaps if we say it enough times it will become true. Abidjan’s many conference organisers are famously unimaginative in their selection of themes, so the classic now is to just to ask what your particular sector can contribute to emergence. Perhaps in September we’ll see ‘The role of grilled food in emergence’ from the Festival des Grillades.

It would be an interesting study to research the origins of the word in the Ivorian political context. I don’t recall the word being used in the 2010 presidential campaign, when for Alassane Ouattara it was ‘ADO Solutions’. Funnily enough, we don’t hear much more about solutions, which perhaps implies too heavily its counterpart of ‘problems’. But by 2012 at least emergence was a regular government theme.

Like many good political mantras, it’s meaning is rather unclear – perhaps it’s simply a new form of that old political idea: hope. In some ways it really just means – I promise that things will get better in the future. The date of 2020 gives more concrete information – we understand implicitly by the vision that it assumes Ouattara wins a second five-year mandate in 2015, and steps down in 2020 after achieving his target.

Beyond just being a synonym for ‘hope’ though, it implies rather firmly that Ivory Coast will be something it now isn’t, on or by 1 January 2020. The way it’s used suggests that being ‘emergent’ or not is a clearly defined thing, but it’s hard to know if (a la Karl Popper) this is a falsifiable concept. A recent article in Le Sursaut (a new paper that’s generally pro government as far as I can tell) is more realistic than most in saying that in 2020 Adjame will remain ‘an open air market characterised by disorder and theft’ and Abidjan’s slums will still look like slums. Even if the most positive projections are realised, the majority will still be (and feel) poor in 2020. Emergence will not be a paradise (cf Russia, India, South Africa). Rather predictable in the 2020 election will be opposition parties saying ‘you tell us we’re emergent, but we still struggle to make ends meet’.

Looking around for definitions of emerging economies (for we are in fact talking about economies), we’re referencing economies that are far short of ‘developed’, but still well above the category of LDCs (least developed countries). Interestingly, this is already a category to which Ivory Coast belongs, according to this map from 2007. A similar category to emergent seems to be ‘newly industrialised‘, which adds a more detailed idea that Ivory Coast will need to boost industry.

Here’s one definition of an emerging economy:

1. Intermediate income : its PPP per capita income is comprised between 10% and 75% of the average EU per capita income.

2. Catching-up growth : during at least the last decade, it has experienced a brisk economic growth that has narrowed the income gap with advanced economies.

3. Institutional transformations and economic opening : during the same period, it has undertaken profound institutional transformations which contributed to integrate it more deeply into the world economy. Hence, emerging economies appears to be a by-product of the current globalization.

Just focusing on that first indicator, EU GDP per capita income in 2013 was $34,300 – so Ivory Coast would need per capita income of at least $3,430, whereas it is currently estimated at $1,529 (2013). To bridge the gap by 2020 would require about 12% growth every year, assuming the EU per capita income doesn’t change and the population stays the same. It’s noticeable though that the IMF ranks India at about the same per capita level as Ivory Coast, despite India being commonly recognised as emerging. As I think I’ve argued here before, one strategy could be just to re-base the national accounts as done in Ghana and Nigeria to have a sudden increase in the estimated GDP.

Anyway, I guess the main point is that if the Ivorian economy continues consistently growing at 8-10%, it’ll soon start getting an increasing amount of media/analyst attention, and it’ll start finding its way into lists of ‘countries to watch’ and ‘emerging frontier markets’. The political message of ‘emergence by 2020′ seems more concrete a change than this sort of gradual reputation-growth. And I wonder what they’ll point to in 2020 when they make the claim that: ‘Look we’re now emergent’.

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Victory at last

Rarely have the eventual winners of the African Cup of Nations started the competition in worse shape. The opening 45 minutes of Ivory Coast’s first group stage match against Guinea constitute some of the most embarrassing football Ivorian fans have seen in a long time. The team had crashed out of the World Cup finals in the summer when an historic place in the knock-out stages had looked like a cakewalk. Without Didier Drogba that team had gone on to limp through Afcon qualifying: never convincing, always just doing enough. After several years at the top of FIFA’s Africa rankings, the team slipped behind rivals like Algeria.

It was all a far cry from 2012 – the last time the team were in Equatorial Guinea. Then they had stormed through qualifying – six wins out of six, and 19 goals scored. The group stages followed a similar vein: three straight wins over Sudan, Burkina Faso and Angola without a goal conceded. Equatorial Guinea were brushed aside in the quarters, and then Mali in the semis – again no goals conceded. The golden generation looked set for glory in the final against Zambia.

The back story to that final was good too (though perhaps not as remarkable as for Zambia). The country was fresh out of a post-election conflict. This was the match that would reconcile Ivorians and draw a line under the political crisis, twenty years on from their last Cup of Nations victory (and the last time Alassane Ouattara had been running the country). Like then, the country had put their faith in an Ivorian coach. Francois Zahoui was woefully paid but he won over the fans.

The fairytale wasn’t to be. The big favourites flopped in the final – Drogba missed a penalty during normal time, and then with no goals scored, Zambia came through on penalties. It was the end of the team’s dominance. No longer did they seem to terrify opponents. Drogba and Zokora retired from international football, and players like Keita, Romaric and Eboue dropped out of the selection.

And so, after crashing out of the World Cup, coach Lamouchi was replaced by the man who’d steered Zambia to victory in 2012; Herve Renard. The team didn’t show much sign of change, and Renard received a tough time in the Ivorian press. Enthusiasm going into the Cup of Nations was at an all-time low. I think it would be fair to say that no-one thought this was their year. There were none of the usual football-related pop songs recorded for the event.

But the team slowly grew in stature. Kolo Toure – who has struggled since the drugs ban – became a warrior in defence. The departures left space for new blood – Bailly, Die, Bony, Aurier, Gradel and Gbohouo. And a sense of belief seemed to grow. Gone was the pressure of being favourites – far stronger was the sense of having something to prove. Penalties are always cruel, and the flip of a coin makes narratives of success or failure; the difference between a generation of heroes, or maybes.

Abidjan is in party mode. The FHB stadium was full since morning. There’s a huge sigh of relief. The tag-line of perennial underachievers hasn’t stuck forever. Something was achieved that will be forever cherished. The media story of a team of global soccer stars that could never play together, could never win anything and could never be replaced was a lie. Stars were supplanted, and after a litany of coaches, for four games at least, the Elephants learned to play together and do enough to get the wins they needed.

Western newspaper articles talk of football bringing political reconciliation to the country. That’s an analysis that is simplistic. Yes, Ivorians from all sides are celebrating one victory and one team, but no-one is naïve. This is real life – there’s a mixture of realising politics is not the be-all-and-end-all, but also that the country has not reached a state of perfection. Government officials have already made ham-fisted attempts to score political points, and the country’s state broadcaster showed the sort of amateurism that no-one is proud of in handling coverage of the great day.

And finally to Drogba. Renard had made repeated pleas to the former captain to come back in the team. There was no doubt the door was open. There has been some criticism on social media – why refuse to play for your country? But at least from his Instagram posts, he’s been totally behind the team. Was under-achievement all really about clashing egos or just bad luck? There must be an element of regret for Drogba that the only trophy that consistently eluded him was won just after his voluntary departure. But Ivorian fans have been quick to dedicate this victory not just to the remaining remnant of that generation – Yaya, Kolo, Kalou, Tiene, Copa – but also to those who took part in all those unsuccessful campaigns in recent years – Aruna Dindane, Kader Keita, Eboue, Arthur Boka, Zokora, Romaric, Baky Kone, but above all Drogba. This was the generation that got Ivory Coast to the World Cup for the first time in 2006 and every tournament since. This was the generation that allowed Ivorian fans to dream each time of possibly winning the Afcon, despite the havoc it played on their nerves. This was a victory for that entire generation.

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Looking back

It’s something of a regret that I started this blog very late into my life in Abidjan: the first post was made in May 2011, at the beginning of the Ouattara presidency. I struggle to remember why I hadn’t been blogging earlier – certainly the previous six months before that first post were some of the most interesting of my life so far, and remained sadly un-blogged.

While this isn’t primarily a political blog, within the first 12 or so months, I tried to analyse the challenges facing the Ouattara presidency, and this morning I was curious to see how things worked out. Here’s a bit of a look-back:

Syndrome 2002 (June 2011)

In my second month of blogging I wondered about the threat of continued military instability. I tried to give some arguments as to why, though the threat of military attacks was real (and proved to be so), the chances of success for anti-government elements were very slim. The government – with the help of neighbours – managed to largely stamp out the problem.

Ouattara’s four big challenges (Oct 2011)
In this post, I picked out four big challenges for the new Ouattara government which I identified as:
i) Reunifying the country (the problem of warlords and smuggling)
ii) Favouring big business (risk of discontent, high market prices)
iii) Changing culture
iv) The Wild west
The reunification of the country seems to have gone reasonably smoothly. I don’t doubt the former com-zone commanders still wield authority, particularly Fofie in Korhogo, but the north seems to have successfully completed its return to the rest of the country, even if some residual concerns linked to the ex-rebellion, particularly demobilisation, persist.

The discussion of the government reconstructing through big business seems to have dated a lot. Talk of high market prices persisted for several years after 2011, but I hear it less now – perhaps because inflation is low (it always was officially low), or because people are starting to feel a few positive impacts from overall economic growth, or perhaps just because people got bored of talking about it. The recent drop in fuel prices should have helped.

Practices of corruption and certain bad work practices may have improved slightly, but I have little evidence to go on. The west is largely calm, with only the occasional and limited armed attack from Liberia, but the land issue is far from sorted out.

Four reasons for pessimism (Oct 2011)
A second blog post in October 2011 played devil’s advocate about why the Ouattara presidency could potentially fail. The reasons were that it was the same people who’d shared power with Gbagbo before, that the business environment had serious issues, that the country faced continuing security challenges, and that there was uncertainty about the role the opposition would play.

From the viewpoint of 2015, things have improved on all those fronts, though the challenges were real. While corruption remains an issue, the government seems to be delivering and I think we’ve moved a few degrees in the right direction towards a more professional civil service. The business environment, while not yet clean, has been made easier, at least according to the Doing Business reports. The threat of armed rebellion has faded, and while the opposition looks increasingly fractured, it is at least attempting to move forward.

Beyond one dimension (June 2012)
‘What will it take to bring true reconciliation to Ivory Coast? Most people say: time. Ouattara will do his two mandates and then retire, Gbagbo will spend 4-5 years fighting his ICC case and then either come back old or get locked up for life. And then in about ten years’ time, when both leaders are off the scene, people will be able to move on.’

‘Our next leaders’ (Aug 2012)
This post made a number of explicit predictions about the big three (Bedie, Ouattara, Gbagbo). Starting with Bedie the explicit prediction was ‘no radical changes while Bedie is alive, a lacklustre performance in 2015 and a continual sense of decay until a dynamic leader is found. Expect overtures from the FPI.’ The text included the comment that deciding on a joint RHDP ticket for the 2015 presidential election would be one-way of putting off the question of succession, which has proved to be the case. I’m not sure I’d use the word ‘decay’ now – some sense of success for the party has come through the sharing in government successes, but there are clear tensions looking forward to the post-Bedie era.

For the Gbagbo camp, my prediction was: ‘finding a leader to replace Gbagbo looks so difficult that he will remain the official figurehead for the movement. 2010 will remain at the centre of pro-Gbagbo debates despite its increasing distance from the present day and an uninspiring leadership will struggle to keep the party on its feet until 2020. The party will increasingly have to address the issue of armed groups acting in Gbagbo’s name.’ The armed attacks are now rare and limited, but replacing Gbagbo or not remains a heated and central issue for the party, which looks even weaker now than it did in 2012. But there is a real constituency behind the LMP/FPI movement, which means the opposition are likely to be a continual force in the future.

Finally for Ouattara, my prediction was: ‘Ouattara wins a second term in 2015, an RDR leadership fight happens in 2016/2017, which Ouattara is heavily involved in behind the scenes to appoint a successor who will continue his tradition.’ I don’t think there’s much to add to that three years on.

Looking ahead the conclusion in 2012 was as follows:
‘The 2020 presidential election will be a very interesting affair indeed with the likelihood of all three major parties having fresh faces competing against each other for the first time in three decades. It also provides an opportunity to move on from the harmful debates of the past 20 years. Providing Ouattara has built a strong track record, his party is probably favourite to remain in power, though some voters may feel it’s time for a change, especially if the RDR fails to select a suitable replacement with an appeal beyond the traditional base, and if the second term gets mired in corruption and falling enthusiasm. The PDCI and the FPI face a major challenge in finding votable replacement leaders, with the PDCI having the added difficulty of being the weaker partner in a governing coalition; government successes will be attributed to the RDR while government weaknesses will favour the opposition.’

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Ivorian repatriate blogs

I’ve noticed that in Ivory Coast I don’t think there’s yet been a single example of that staple of other West African blogospheres – the repatriate blog. You know the ones: the returning West African national excited about heading home after a western education and a few years of professional work, to accept the lower paid job, but with better lifestyle options and a return to roots. There’s usually plenty of wax cloth, praise for fresh fruit/veg and home recipes, and a fair bit of frustration as well.

It’s quite possible I’ve missed a blog along these lines, though if not, I wonder why we haven’t seen this. Speculatively, there are a few possibilities:

– Maybe Ivorians are not (yet) willingly returning home to take a job here, and enjoy either the lifestyle benefits or the chance to play a role in the AfricaRising story. The profiles in Tycoon magazine seem to suggest otherwise, with regular articles on those with a western masters, a few years at a blue-chip company, and then return. On my most recent trip, I was also told that the minor construction boom in places like Riviera Mputo is in part driven by expat Ivorians returning home, though perhaps these are slightly older folks than your stereotypical blogger.

– One answer might be that blogging was all the rage a few years back when Ivory Coast was in crisis and not a place many Ivorians in the West wanted to willingly return to.

– It may be that the repatriate blog is more of an anglophone phenomenon; perhaps there’s even something in the Ivorian psyche against the sort of transparent self-exposure in detailing the hopes, dreams and disillusions of the return home.

Any suggestions?

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